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  This paper examines how ownership structure affects quality choice and the subsequent 
equilibrium outcomes within a duopoly framework. Specifically, investor owned firms and 
cooperatives are analyzed in a closed market setting where these firms may coexist in the 
economy. The conditions under which ownership structure matters are identified. We conclude 
that ownership structure matters if the cost of quality at farm level is fixed or if there is a variable 
cost exhibiting non-constant returns to scale. Two farm level cost functions, a fixed cost function 
that is increasing and convex in quality, and a variable cost function that is increasing and 
convex in quantity are analyzed. The two processing firms play a two-stage game where each of 
the firms produces either high or low quality goods. In the first stage they decide the level of 
quality to produce, and in the second stage they compete in prices. In the case of a fixed cost 
function only cooperatives consider the costs incurred at farm level in the first stage of the game. 
Hence, investor owned firms produce higher levels of qualities at lower prices and generates a 
larger consumer surplus than cooperatives. The high quality market share is constant in all 
scenarios. In the case of a variable cost function at farm level, the cooperative has a cost 
advantage, as the investor owned processor has to pay farm level marginal cost for all farm 
inputs. It is found that cooperatives generate higher levels and larger quantities of the high 
quality good at lower prices. This results in higher profits and a larger market share of the high 
quality good. The cooperative structure also generates a larger consumer surplus and a higher 
total welfare than the investor owned structure.  
 
  21.   Introduction 
  Changing consumer preferences, negative publicity pertaining to food safety/quality, and 
increased international competition as a result of deregulation has resulted in an increased focus 
on food quality in recent years.
1 In response, the food marketing chain has developed various 
quality assurance schemes and private labels to be communicated to consumers.
2 By developing 
quality assurance schemes and requiring suppliers (e.g. farmers) to implement these, companies 
downstream (e.g. process industry) are able to control the quality of the final product and 
ultimately to gain consumer trust, increased market shares, and increased profits.  
  There exists an extensive literature on quality choice and the effects thereof. The 
literature varies pertaining to the type of market condition, type of competition, cost of quality 
(none, fix, or variable), consumer information, type of quality (consumer or cost driven), type of 
game etc. Despite the extensive literature, the incentive structure for investments in quality 
assurance schemes given different ownership structures is to a large extent a theoretically and 
empirically overlooked issue.  
  Farmer cooperatives exist worldwide. However, recent events indicate that the 
cooperative organizational structure is facing some problems, especially in the presence of fierce 
international competition (Nilsson, 1994). Problems associated with the decision making process 
and the equity formation for long term investments within the cooperative entity are well known 
and have been subject to extensive analysis in the literature. In this literature, the incentive 
structure for investments in quality assurance schemes given the cooperative management 
structure is an overlooked issue. This is especially true in the context of markets where various 
forms of organizational structures appear. Lambertini (1997) analyzed quality choice in a setting 
including a cooperative structure. Lambertini, however, examines the special case of a 
monopolist producing one type of quality. He compares the outcome of a labor-managed and a 
profit-maximizing monopolist and concludes that the produced output is the same but the labor-
managed monopolist produces a significantly lower quality. Quality choice and vertical 
integration has been examined by Economides (1999). He analyzed and compared two vertically 
related monopolists and a sole integrated monopolist and found that the latter produced higher 
                                                 
1 GATT- and WTO has had a general impact on economic conditions and policy developments world wide. Within 
the EU the creation of the internal market has further enhanced competition.  
2 In this study quality assurance schemes refers to schemes communicated to consumers, as opposed to internal 
schemes improving efficiency etc without being directly communicated to consumers. 
  3quality, and larger consumer as well as producer surplus. The question is then how vertical 
integration affects the quality choice and the relative position of firms with different ownership 
structures in an oligpolistic setting.  
  This paper focus on how and to what extent quality choice and the subsequent 
equilibrium outcomes are affected by different ownership structures. Specifically, different 
mixtures of investor owned firms (IOFs) and cooperatives (COOPs) are analyzed in a duopoly 
setting. The following questions are examined: 
(i)  Under which circumstances is it relevant to consider ownership structure in analyzing 
quality choice? As cooperatives and investor owned firms differ in how the maximization 
problem is specified, this is a question of which farm level cost functions that produce different 
outcomes for COOPs and IOFs. 
(ii)  Given different ownership structures in the market, what are the equilibrium outcomes of 
quality levels, prices, quantities, welfare effects and high-quality market share? Is any specific 
ownership structure more or less favorable to society as a whole and are there any economic 
advantages/disadvantages with a vertically integrated cooperative structure.  
  This study contributes to the existing literature in that it focus on ownership structure and 
includes cooperatives in the analysis of endogenous quality choice. Furthermore, the starting 
point for the analysis is a general cost function and from this, the cost functions that yield 
different outcomes depending on ownership structure are identified and examined. As opposed to 
previous work, one of the cost functions examined allows for diminishing returns to scale. The 
presented model draws on Tennbakk's (1995) work of a closed mixed duopoly economy 
including cooperatives and investor owned firms where these firms may coexist in the economy. 
This approach is expanded to incorporate endogenous quality choice where two firms play a two 
stage game where each firm first simultaneously chooses their quality level and then compete in 
prices in the second stage of the game (see e.g. Motta, 1993). The economic effects of the four 
possible scenarios described in Table 1 are examined and compared and the stability of each is 
tested.  
 
  4Table 1.  Scenarios of Duopolistic Market Structures Analyzed 
High-quality producer    
Ownership structure IOF COOP 
IOF  Scenario (II)  Scenario (CI)  Low-quality 
producer  COOP   Scenario (IC)  Scenario (CC) 
 
  The outline of the paper is as follows. In the next section the methodology is presented 
and in section 3 the cost functions generating different outcomes for different ownership 
structures are identified. It is found that fixed as well as variable costs of quality matters. The 
latter case requires non-constant returns to scale. In section 4 the case with fixed cost of quality 
is examined assuming Bertrand competition and in section 5 the case with variable cost of 
quality is analyzed. The results are summarized and some conclusions are presented in section 6. 
In the case of a fixed farm level cost function, we find that as investor owned firms does not 
consider the farm level cost function when choosing quality level, IOFs underestimate the actual 
cost of quality thereby producing higher levels of quality at lower prices implying a larger 
consumer surplus. On the other hand cooperatives promote higher producer surplus and for high 
quality costs also a higher total welfare. In the case of a variable farm level cost function, the 
result show that the cooperative structure generates a larger quality spread and a larger total 
volume than does an investor owned structure. A high-quality producing COOP generates a 
higher level of quality, lower price, larger quantity, larger profits and larger share of the high 
quality good. In addition, COOPs produce larger consumer surplus and higher total welfare.  
 
2.   Methodology  
  The presented model draws on Tennbakk's (1995) work of a closed mixed duopoly 
economy including cooperatives and investor owned firms where these firms may coexist in the 
economy. This approach is expanded to incorporate endogenous quality choice where each firm 
chooses to produce either high or low quality (see e.g. Motta, 1993). Consumers as well as 
producers are assumed to have perfect information. Consumers have the same indirect utility 
function, U(, vi) = vi - pi, if they buy product i, and zero utility otherwise. vi denotes the level 
of quality and pi the price of product i. Consumers differ in their tastes represented by the 
parameter . A continuum of consumers is uniformly distributed with density one over the 
  5interval   [
+, 
-]. In accordance with the standard literature on product differentiation, each 
consumer is assumed to either buy one unit of the good or not buy at all (Tirole, 1988; Motta, 
1993). In a model of vertical product differentiation all consumers unambiguously rank the 
goods the same. However, only consumers with a higher  will be willing to pay more to acquire 
a product of higher quality.
3 Hence, the industry is facing a downward sloping demand curve. 
  In the present duopoly setting, there are two processing firms (a and b) and a large 
number of independent farmers supplying the raw material. The two firms play a two stage game 
where each firm first chooses quality level vi and then compete in prices in the second stage of 
the game (see e.g. Metrick & Zeckhauser (1999), Lehmann-Grube (1997), Ueng (1997), Aoki & 
Prusa (1996)). One of the processors will produce high quality, denoted vH, and the other low 
quality, denoted vL.
4 By assumption vH   vL  1. Setting a lower bound to the quality level can be 
interpreted as a minimum quality standard required by law or by the market forces (Motta, 
1993). Farmers supplying the raw material are assumed to hold no market power on their own 
and to have identical cost functions. Dividing the population into two equally sized groups, 
farmers belong to either group A or to group B, supplying to processing firm a and firm b 
respectively (Tennbakk, 1995). 
  Each of the two processing firms can be either a cooperative or an investor owned firm. 
Following the approach by Wann and Sexton (1992), a fixed proportions technology is assumed 
between the intermediate raw material (i.e. the farm product) and the processed product. For 
expository ease, the cost function related to production at farm level and the costs incurred at 
process level are treated as separable. Denote the type of quality with subscript i, where i = H, L, 
referring to high and low quality respectively and let subscript k refer to the individual farmer. 
Prices and quantities are denoted p and q. Then, at farm level the cost function for farmer k 
producing quality i is denoted c
F
ki(.) while the cost function for costs specific for the process 
level is described by c
P
i(.).
5 The investor owned firm will pay the farm level marginal cost for 
inputs and, hence, the maximization problem of the IOF can be formulated as in (2.1).  

IOF




ki(.)/ qki]qi      (2.1) 
                                                 
3 Alternatively,  can be interpreted as the marginal rate of substitution, see eg. Tirole (1988). 
4 The possibility of entry is ignored. 
5 The quantity of quality i produced by a processing firm is denoted qi and the quantity of quality i produced by 
farmer k is denoted qki.  
  6  Following Sexton (1986) the cooperative firm is viewed as horizontally integrated across 
farms. In addition, the cooperative is vertically integrated between the primary farm production 
and the process industry up until the wholesale level. The maximization problem of the 
cooperative is formulated as a joint maximization problem of the cooperative processing firm 
and the individual members/owners (Sexton, 1986). Hence, introduction of quality assurance 
schemes by this industry group may serve a dual purpose by increasing volume at the farm level 
as well as the profits at the processing level thereby contributing towards an increase of joint 
profits. The cost structure of the vertically integrated firm accounts for the integral of the supply 
function at the farm/primary industry level and the processing cost function. A cooperative 
producing quality i will earn the profit 

COOP









The functional form of the farm level cost function will be decisive for the outcome since 
cooperatives and IOFs differ in how the maximization problem is specified. Hence, before 
analyzing the outcomes of different combinations of ownership structures, we will focus on the 
cost function and address the first objective: When is it relevant to consider ownership structure 
in analyzing quality choice? 
 
3.   The Relevance of Ownership Structure 
  As cooperatives and investor owned firms differ in how the maximization problem is 
specified, the functional form of the farm level cost function will be decisive for the outcome. 
On the contrary, the functional form of the processing quality costs incurred is not sensitive for 
our results. However, it seems reasonable to assume that the process level incur some fixed costs 
in developing a scheme. Furthermore, as pointed out by Lehmann-Grube (1997), the quality 
choice has to be, at least partially, irreversible in order for the proposed two-stage game to be 
relevant. As higher quality is likely to demand a more comprehensive and costly scheme, we 
model this cost function as increasing and convex in quality, c
P
i(vi) = vi
2. Henceforth, we refer 
to all costs not related to quality as “non-quality” costs while costs related to quality are referred 
to as “quality” costs. To maintain the focus on the relevance of ownership structure, all non-
quality costs are assumed to be zero. 
  Different specifications of the cost functions have been used in the previous literature. 
Some studies assume the quality costs to be zero (Shaked & Sutton, 1982; Tirole, 1988; Choi & 
  7Shin, 1992; Donnenfeld & Weber, 1992; Wauthy, 1996; Metrick & Zeckhauser, 1999). As 
pointed out by e.g. Lehmann-Grube (1997), the assumption that quality can be obtained at no 
cost is unreasonable. Other studies consider the cost of quality as a variable cost given constant 
returns to scale (Motta, 1993; Bijl, 1997; Bonnano & Haworth, 1998; Ueng, 1997) or assume a 
fixed cost (Motta, 1993; Lehmann-Grube, 1997).  
  Assume that farmers have a quality cost function that includes both a fixed and a variable 
component. The cost function for farmer k producing quality of type i is defined as in (3.1), 
being a function of the level of quality and the quantity produced. Assuming that all farmers 
have identical cost functions qki  K
-1qi (K =  k, k  A, B). Consequently, the cost function 
relevant for the COOP is obtained by summing over all farmers delivering to the COOP, k  A, 
and is denoted c
F
i (qi, vi). Then, the profit functions for the COOP firm and the IOF firm can be 
defined as in (3.3) and (3.4) respectively.   
c
F




     (3.1) 
c
F















m   (3.2) 

IOF





 qi   =  piqi - vi
g -  n  vi
h K
-( n-1) qi
n   (3.3) 

COOP




i(·)     =  piqi - vi




m      (3.4) 
  First consider the case with only fix costs, i.e.  = 0 and   0. Taking the derivatives of 
(3.3) & (3.4) w.r.t. the level of quality, vi, we find that   0 is a sufficient condition for the 
equilibrium quality levels and profits to depend on ownership structure (see Appendix 1). In the 
subsequent sections it is assumed that the farm level cost function associated with fixed costs of 
quality is increasing and convex in the level of quality and specified as c
F
ki(.) = k vi
2/2. This cost 
function is the same as in Motta (1993) and similar to the cost functions specified in e.g. Aoki et 
al (1996) and Lehmann-Grube (1997).
6 
  Secondly, consider the case with only variable costs, i.e.   0 and  = 0. Taking the 
derivatives of the profit functions w.r.t. prices it is evident that the equilibrium quantities and 
prices will depend on ownership structure IFF 	n	 > 1, i.e. given that the cost function does not 
exhibit CRS (see Appendix 1). As a consequence, 	n	 > 1 is a necessary and sufficient 
condition for quality levels and profits etc to be dependent on ownership structure given  = 0. 
This finding is not surprising as the case without product differentiation, assuming the same cost 
 
6 Transformed to the notation used in this paper, the cost functions are ci(vi) = vi in Aoki (1996); ci(vi) = vi
2 in 
Lehmann-Grube (1997), and ci(vi,qi) = vi
2/2 in Motta (1993). 
  8function, yield the same result. In the subsequent sections, the variable farm level cost function is 
assumed to be increasing (rather than decreasing) and convex in quantity, and of the form 
c
F
ki(vi,qki) =  vi qik
2. Hence, the IOF fraction of the industry faces an upward sloping supply 
function accounted for in the maximization problem for each firm. In the literature, variable cost 
of quality with technology exhibiting CRS has been examined by e.g. Ueng (1997), Bonnano et 
al (1998), and Motta (1993).
7 In some cases it may be relevant to specify the farm level cost 
function as exhibiting CRS. However, it follows from equations (3.3) and (3.4) that ownership 
structure is not an issue in that case and hence we refer the reader to the mentioned references.  
  In conclusion, ownership structure affects the equilibrium outcomes in all cases except 
when we have a variable cost function exhibiting CRS. In the next section, the case with fixed 
cost of quality is examined assuming Bertrand competition. The cost function includes only a 
fixed component, is increasing and convex in quality, and is specified as c
F
ki(vi) = k vi
2/2. The 
sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium is obtained by backwards induction. Taking quality levels as 
fixed we start by solving the price setting sub-game. Once we have solved the price setting 
second stage of the game we can solve for the optimal level of qualities in the first stage of the 
game. In section 5, the case of variable cost of quality is examined assuming the cost function 
consists only of a variable component, is increasing and convex in quantity, and is specified as 
c
F




4.   Fixed Cost of Quality 
  In this section the case with fixed cost of quality is examined. As IOFs underestimate the 
actual cost of quality by not considering the farm level cost in the quality stage of the game, 
IOFs promote higher levels of quality, lower prices, higher consumer surplus and, for small 
quality costs, higher total welfare than COOPs. Cooperatives promote higher producer surplus 
and for large quality costs also a higher total welfare while the market share of the high-quality 
good is unaffected by the ownership structure. 
  Taking quality levels as fixed we start by solving the price setting sub-game. As 
previously mentioned, consumers have the same indirect utility function U(, vi) = vi - pi. The 
                                                 
7 In our notation, the cost functions used are ci(vi,qi) = vi
2qi in Ueng (1997); ci(vi,qi) = viqi in Bonnano et al 
(1998), and ci(vi,qi) = vi
2qi/2 in Motta (1993). 
8 c
F
i(qi, vi ) = k
K c
F
ki(qi, vi ) =  vi K
-1qi
2. For notational convenience, and without loss of generality,  is normalized 
and redefined such that   K
-1.  = k
K k. 
  9consumer will buy the high quality good if U(, vH) 	 U(, vL) and U(, vH) 	 0, and she will buy 
the low-quality good if U(, vL) > U(, vH) and U(, vL) 	 0.
9 The consumer indifferent between 
the two goods has the taste parameter LH = (pH - pL)/(vH - vL) and the consumer indifferent 
between buying the low quality good and not buying at all has the taste parameter 
                                                
L = pL/vL. 
The demand functions can then be constructed using these results and noting that any consumer 
getting the same utility from a high and a low quality good at a certain price unambiguously 
prefer the high-quality good. The demand for the high quality good is represented by the 
consumers that have a taste parameter in the interval 
+ 	  	 HL while the demand for the low 
quality good is represented by the consumers with a taste parameter HL
 
  	 L. Consumers 
with a taste parameter  < L
  will not buy at all. Hence, we get demand functions for the two 
goods as defined by (4.1) and (4.2).With a fixed farm level cost function, c
F
ki(.) = k vi
2/2, the 
profit functions for COOP and IOF are defined as in (4.3) and (4.4): 
qH   = 

+- (pH-pL)/(vH-vL) (4.1) 
qL   = (pH-pL)/(vH-vL) - pL / vL (4.2) 

IOF





 qi  = piqi - vi
2/2   (4.3) 

COOP




ki(·)    = piqi - (1+) vi
2/ 2     (4.4) 
  For each scenario, the demand equations (4.1) and (4.2) are substituted into the profit 
functions (4.3) and (4.4). Differentiating the obtained profits with respect to prices we can solve for 
the optimal quantities, prices and profits. As the first order conditions do not depend on ownership 
structure, we can state the equilibrium prices ((4.7) and (4.8)), quantities ((4.9) and (4.10)), and revenue 
functions ((4.11) and (4.12)) as general cases independent of ownership structure.  
H/pH   = [
vL(vH-vL)-vL(2pH-pL)]/[vL(vH-vL)] = 0  (4.5) 
L/pL    = [vLpH-2vHpL]/[vL(vH-vL)]   = 0  (4.6) 
qH(vH, vL)   =  2
vH / [4vH - vL]   =  2
z / [4z - 1] = 2qL
j   (4.7) 
qL(vH, vL)   =  
vH / [4vH - vL]   = 
z / [4z - 1]  (4.8) 
pH(vH, vL)   = 2
vH(vH-vL)/ [4vH - vL]   = 2
zvL(z-1)/ [4z - 1] = (vH-vL)qH
j     (4.9) 
pL(vH, vL)   = 
vL(vH-vL)  / [4vH - vL]   = 
vL(z-1)/[4z-1] = vL(vH-vL)qL
j /vH     (4.10) 
RH(vH, vL) =  4

2vH
2(vH-vL)/ [4vH - vL]
2   = 4

2z
2vL(z-1)/ [4z - 1]
2   (4.11) 
RL(vH, vL)  = 

2vHvL(vH-vL)  / [4vH - vL]
2   = 

2zvL(z-1)  / [4z - 1]
2 (4.12) 
 
9 A consumer buy the high quality good if (i) U(,vH) = vH - pH  vL - pL= U(,vL), i.e. if   (pH-pL)/(vH-vL) and 
(ii) U(,vH) = vH - pH  0, i.e. if    pH /vH. A consumer buy a low quality good if (i) U(, vH) = vH - pH < vL - pL 
= U(,vL), i.e. if  < (pH-pL)/(vH-vL), and (ii) U(,vL) = vL – pL  0, i.e. if    pL /vL (Metrick et al, 1999). 
  10  Substituting the equilibrium prices and quantities into the profit functions (4.3) and (4.4) 
we obtain the equilibrium profits as functions of the quality levels for the four different scenarios 
respectively. In solving the first stage of the game, the optimal profits are differentiated w.r.t. the 
level of quality. Substituting for vH = zvL, we can solve for the quality spread z. By substituting z 
into optimal profits we can solve for the optimal quality levels of vH and vL and by specifying a 
value of the cost parameter  we can then get explicit solutions in terms of . Using these values 
we can explicitly solve for profits, prices, quantities and calculate welfare effects and market 
shares. In Table 2 the profit functions, the equilibrium quality spread and quality levels for each 
of the four scenarios are presented. 
 
Table 2. Equilibrium Outcomes - Fixed Cost of Quality 
Scenario (II): The Case with two IOFs   

II
H  = 4
2vH
2(vH-vL) / [4vH - vL]
2 - vH
2 / 2      (4:13a) 

II
L  =  
2vHvL(vH-vL) / [4vH - vL]
2- vL
2 / 2      (4:14a) 

II
i / vi ; vH  z vL; z   1 ==>   4z
3-23z
2+12z-8 = 0      (4:15a) 
vL
II   =  [
2vH
2(4vH-7vL)]/[4vH-vL]
3    = [
2z(4z
2-7z)]/[4z-1]
3    (4:16a) 
vH




3   = 4
2z(4z
2+2-3z)/[4z-1]
3     (4:17a) 
Scenario (CC): The Case with two COOPs   

CC
H  =  4
2vH
2(vH-vL) / [4vH - vL]
2 - (1+)vH
2 / 2      (4:13b) 

CC
L  =  
2vHvL(vH-vL) / [4vH - vL]
2- (1+)vL
2 / 2      (4:14b) 

CC
i/vi; vH  z vL; z   1 ==>   4z
3-23z
2+12z-8 = 0     (4:15b) 
vL
CC   = [
2vH
2(4vH-7vL)]/{(1+)[4vH-vL]
3}   = vL
II / (1+) (4:16b) 
vH




3]  = vH
II /(1+)    (4:17b) 
Scenario (IC): The Case with a high-quality IOF and a low-quality COOP       

IC
H  =  4
2vH
2(vH-vL) / [4vH - vL]
2 - vH
2 /2    (4:13c) 

IC
L  =  
2vHvL(vH-vL) / [4vH - vL]
2- (1+)vL
2 / 2    (4:14c) 
i/vi; vH  z vL; z   1 ==>  (4z
3-7z
2)-4(1+)(4z
2+2-3z) = 0  (4:15c) 
vL
IC
   =  [
2vH
2(4vH-7vL)]/{(1+)[4vH-vL]
3}  =  {vL
II z = z
IC } / (1+)    (4:16c) 
vH
IC




3  =  {vH
II z = z
IC }  (4:17c) 
Scenario (CI): The Case with a high-quality COOP and a low-quality IOF      

CI
H   =  4
2vH
2(vH-vL) / [4vH - vL]
2-(1+)vH
2 / 2      (4:13d) 

CI
L   =  
2vHvL(vH-vL) / [4vH - vL]
2-vL
2/ 2      (4:14d) 

CC
i/vi; vH  z vL; z   1 ==>  (1+)(4z
3-7z
2) -4(4z
2+2-3z) = 0  (4:15d) 
vL
CI  
 =  [
2vH(4vH
2-7vHvL)]/[4vH-vL]
3    =  {vL
II z = z
CI }   (4:16d) 
vH




3} =  {vH
II z = z
CI } / (1+) (4:17d) 
 











ki(.) for IOFs and COOPs respectively. The second derivatives are 
both negative given the assumption that vH 	 vL.
10 Hence, the solutions given by equations (4.16) 
- (4.17) represents local maxima. In order for these to be Nash equilibria, we have to prove that 
the solutions are stable, i.e. that they represent the optimal response so that neither firm has an 
incentive to deviate. Following Motta (1993), we assume firm 1 produce the high-quality vH, and 
firm 2 produce the low-quality vL. For the solutions to be Nash equilibria we have to be sure that 
(i) there is no other vHvH* (vLvL*) that is more profitable to firm 1 (firm 2), and (ii) there is no 
incentive for firm 1 (firm 2) to leapfrog the rival firm and itself produce the lower (higher) 
quality. Formally, the following conditions have to be satisfied in order for our solutions to be 
Nash equilibria: 
1(vH*, vL*)  1(vH, v2 = vL*) for vH   vL*     (4.18) 
1(vH*, vL*)  1(vL, v2 = vL*) for vL   vL*     (4.19) 
2(vL*, vH*)  2(vL, v1 = vH*) for vL   vH* (4.20) 
2(vL*, vH*)  2(vH, v1 = vH*) for vH  vH* (4.21) 
In solving equations (4.15) we found that there is only one possible solution that satisfies the 
assumption that vH  vL (i.e. z  1). Hence, conditions (4.18) and (4.20) are satisfied.
11 The 
condition that there is no incentive to leapfrog the rival and switch type of quality for neither of 
the firms is represented in (4.19) and (4.21). In Appendix 2 it is shown that these conditions are 
satisfied for scenario (II), (CC), and (IC) for all values of  while in the scenario (CI) the 
conditions are fulfilled for all   0.59.  
  The revenue functions are defined as in equations (4.11) and (4.12) and are independent 
of the cost parameter . Differentiating equations (4.11) and (4.12) we find that the revenue 
functions have the following properties RH*/vH > 0; RH*/vL* < 0; RL*/vL > 0; RL*/vH* > 
0.
12 Naturally, the slope of the revenue function has to equal the slope of the cost function for 
each firm in equilibrium. The cost functions have the property Ci
COOP/vi = (1+)vi for 
cooperatives and Ci
IOF/vi = vi for IOFs.  Hence, a fixed cost of quality at farm level does not 
                                                 
10 
2H/vH





2 < 0 ; 
2L /vL






For an IOF, 
2TC/vi
2 = -1 < 0, and for a COOP
2TC/vi
2= - (1+) < 0. 
11 For the high-quality firm i to produce any other level of quality such that vH   vL* would yield a lower profit than 
producing vH*, i.e. condition (4.18) is satisfied. Correspondingly, for the low-quality firm j to produce any other 
level of quality such that vL  	 vH* would yield a lower profit than producing vL*, i.e. condition (4.20) is satisfied. 
12 This has been shown by eg Aoki et al (1996). 
  12directly affect behavior of the IOF and, as a consequence, the equilibrium solution in scenario 
(II) is unaffected by changes in . In the remaining scenarios, an increase in  implies an 
increase in the cost of production for at least one of the producers, which will affect the 
equilibrium solutions. For example, assume that the firm producing low quality is a cooperative 
and the firm producing high quality is an IOF, i.e. the (IC) scenario. As  increases, the cost 
function of the cooperative becomes more convex, while the revenue function is unaffected. 
Hence, by concavity of the revenue function and convexity of the cost function, the firm would 
earn a higher profit producing a lower quality as  increases. This reduction in vL shift the 
revenue curve of the high-quality producing firm upwards as RH*(vH, vL*)/vL* < 0. Unless the 
high-quality producing IOF decreases their quality level, RH*/vH > CH/vH. Hence, it is 
optimal to reduce vH which reduce the revenue of the low-quality producing COOP as RL*/vH 
> 0, i.e. it is optimal for the IOF to decrease the level of quality. Equilibrium is reached in 
(vH*,vL*) where Ri*/vi = Ci/vi is achieved for both firms.  
  In the case where  = 0, the same outcome is generated in all scenarios. This reference 
outcome is principally the same as in Motta (1993). Motta examines one level of the chain and 
includes a fixed cost as specified in this paper for the process level. In the scenario with only 
investor owned firms, an increase in  will not affect the equilibrium outcomes. As the cost 
increase the producer surplus decrease and, hence, total welfare decrease as well. In the scenario 
with only cooperatives higher costs of production associated affects both firms proportionally 
such that the relative cost remains constant. Hence, the optimal response is to retain the same 
relative quality levels, i.e. a constant quality spread. A higher cost imply lower levels of quality, 
which in turn implies lower prices, revenues and profits. Producer and consumer surplus 
decreases as  increases. As both firms are affected proportionally, quality levels, prices and 
profits for the cooperatives equals that of a market with only IOFs adjusted by the cost 
increase.
13 
  In the mixed scenarios, the relative competitiveness of the COOP decreases as  
increases due to a more convex cost function. In the (IC) scenario, higher costs of production 
affects only the low-quality cooperative which implies that the level of quality decreases. As the 
high-quality level remains approximately constant, the quality spread increases, the high-quality 













  13price increases and the low-quality price decreases. Furthermore, quantities decreases slightly, 
profits increase for the IOF and decreases for the COOP and overall producer surplus decreases 
as  increases. Increased production costs imply a smaller consumer surplus and a smaller total 
welfare. In scenario (CI), higher costs of production implies that the cooperative decreases the 
level of high quality. This increases the competition between the goods and the quality spread 
decreases, which imply larger quantities of both qualities. The prices decrease as the low-quality 
level and the quality spread decreases. Profits decreases for the IOF as well as for the COOP and 
overall producer surplus decreases as do consumer surplus and total welfare.  
 
Results 
  In Table 3 the comparison between the four scenarios are summarized and within 
brackets it is shown, in each scenario, how the variables are affected as the cost of quality 
increases. Only the cooperative structure considers the fixed cost of quality at farm level when 
choosing the level of quality. Hence, investor owned firms underestimate the actual cost of 
quality in the first stage of the game. Consequently, it is natural that the case with only investor 
owned firms produce the highest levels of quality, the case with only cooperatives produce the 
lowest and that scenario (IC) produces a higher level of high quality and a lower level of low 
quality than scenario(CI). 
  The difference in the degree of convexity of the cost function between the scenarios 
imply that the quality levels in each scenario are affected differently as previously explained. In 
the scenarios with only one type of ownership structure, the relative cost of production is 
independent of , and the quality spread is the same and constant in these scenarios. In the mixed 
scenarios, the relative cost advantage of the investor owned firm is larger if the IOF is the high-
quality producer. Hence, the quality spread is largest, and increasing, in scenario (IC) and lowest, 
and decreasing, in scenario (CI).  
  Quantities only depend on the quality spread and, hence the quantities produced in a 
setting with only one type of ownership structure are constant. The mixed scenario with a high-
quality cooperative has the smallest quality spread and consequently produces the largest 
volumes of both quantities while the opposite is true for the mixed scenarios with a low-quality 
cooperative. Furthermore, it is evident from equation (4.7)-(4.8) that the high-quality firm 
produces twice the quantity of the low-quality firm, i.e. the market share of the high-quality good 
  14is consistently 2/3. This is in accordance with previous literature not incorporating the aspect of 
ownership structure, which has concluded that the high-quality firm produces a larger quantity 
than the low-quality firm (Motta, 1993; Aoki, 1996; Lehmann-Grube, 1997; Metrick & 
Zeckhauser, 1999).
14   
 
Table 3:  Summary - Fixed Cost of Quality
  a)            
z IC()  >  II(=)  =   CC (=)  >   CI ()  
vL      II (=)  >  CI()  >   IC ()  >   CC ()  
vH   II (=)  >  IC ()
b)  >   CI ()  >   CC ()   
qL       CI()  >  II (=)  =   CC(=)  >   IC ()  
qH    CI()  >  II (=)  =   CC(=)  >   IC ()  
qT    CI ()  >  II (=)  =   CC(=)  >   IC ()   
pL    II (=)  >  CI ()  >   IC () >   CC()  
pH    IC () >  II  (=) >   CC()  >   CI ()   
L 
  II (=)  >  CI()  >   IC ()  >   CC ()  
H 
  IC ()  >  II (=)  >   CC ()  >   CI ()   
Producer Surplus 
c) CC() >  CI  () <>    IC  () >   II  () 
 
Consumer Surplus  II (=)  >  IC() > CI  () >  CC  ()  
Total Welfare 
d) >  II  () > IC  () >  CI  () >  CC() > 
High Quality Market share  IC (=)  =  II (=)  =  CC (=)  =   CI (=)   
Within brackets the direction of the change within each scenario as  increases is shown. 
a) As pointed out in the 
text, in the (CI) scenario a Nash Equilibrium only exists for  < 0.59. 
b) Small changes. 
c) IC > CI for  < 0.15 , and 
CI > IC for   0.15. 
d)  Switches such that for  > 2 CC>IC>II. 
  
  The market can be considered to be more competitive the smaller the quality spread, i.e. 
the less differentiated the products are. A more competitive market will have smaller price 
differences and larger quantities than a less competitive market. From equations (4.9) and (4.10) 
it is evident that in equilibrium it is always optimal to have relative price equal to 2z, i.e. the 
price spread increases the less competitive the market is. Equations (4.7) and (4.8) show that the 
total quantity will be qT = 3z/(4z-1) which is decreasing in z. Hence, we conclude that (CI) is 
the most competitive scenario, with the smallest quality spread, the smallest price spread and the 
largest total quantity while (IC) is the least competitive scenario. The unmixed markets are 
equally competitive and less competitive than the (CI) scenario but more competitive than the 
(IC) scenario. 
                                                 
14 This has been shown to be true both for simultanous and sequential games. 
  15  A well-established result in the literature on vertical product differentiation is that the 
high-quality firm earns higher profits than the low-quality firm (Shaked & Sutton, 1982; Tirole, 
1988; Choi & Shin, 1992; Donnenfeld & Weber, 1992; Motta, 1993; Aoki & Prusa, 1996; 
Metrick & Zeckhauser, 1999). Lehmann-Grube (1997) has shown that in a duopoly setting not 
taking ownership structure into account, the high-quality firm will earn higher profits for all 
fixed cost functions that are increasing and convex in quality. We find that this is true for all 
scenarios for all Nash equilibria (see Appendix 3).  
  All scenarios have the same cost structure but they differ in the quality levels choosen by 
the processors. As investor owned firm does not consider the fixed farm level cost in the choice 
of quality, the producer surplus incorporating profits at farm level is smallest in the case with 
only IOFs, and largest in the case with only cooperatives. The consumer surplus is lowest in the 
market with only cooperative firms, which has the lowest levels of quality and highest quality 
costs. Highest consumer surplus is generated in the market with only investor owned firms, 
where the reverse is true. If the cost of quality is low, the total social welfare is highest in 
scenario (II) and lowest in scenario (CC), as the consumer surplus. If the costs are high, the 
producer surplus becomes more dominant and eventually total social welfare is highest in (CC) 
and lowest in (II). 
 
5.   Variable Cost of Quality 
  In this section we analyze the case were the cost of quality is assumed to be variable 
instead of fixed. We find that a high-quality producing cooperative promote a higher level of 
quality, lower prices, larger volumes, larger profits and larger market share of the high-quality 
good. The cooperative structure also implies a larger quality spread and larger total quantity. In 
addition, COOPs implies larger consumer surplus and higher total welfare.  
  The demand side is as described in section 4, and the direct demand as shown in 
equations (4.1) and (4.2). In the case of variable quality cost, ownership structure will only 
matter when there are non-constant returns to scale, as noted in section 3. With a variable farm 
level cost function defined as c
F
ki(qki, vi) =  vi qki








ki(.)/ qki]qi   = piqi - vi/2 - 2 vi qi
2      (5.1) 

COOP




ki(.)     =  piqi - vi/2 -  vi qi
2        (5.2) 
  16  In the first stage of the game, the firms choose their level of quality and in the second 
stage of the game they compete in prices. Following the procedure presented in section 4, the 
solution can be found by backwards induction. Hence, we start by solving the second stage of the 
game by substituting the demand equations (4.1) and (4.2) into the profit functions (5.1) and 
(5.2) and differentiating the obtained profits with respect to prices. It is then possible to solve for 
the optimal quantities, prices and profits in terms of the quality levels. As the first order 
conditions depend on ownership structure and hence the equilibrium prices, quantities, profit and 
revenue functions are unique for each scenario. Therefore, it is necessary to specify the solutions 
for each scenario. Once we have obtained the profits as a function of the levels of quality for 
each specific scenario, we differentiate the optimal profits by the level of quality, substitute for 
vH = zvL and solve for the quality spread z. The optimal quality levels of vH and vL are obtained 
by substituting z into the optimal profits, and by specifying a value of the cost parameter , 
explicit numerical solutions in terms of  are derived. Using these values we can explicitly solve 
for profits, prices, quantities and calculate welfare effects and market shares etc. In Table 4 
prices, quantities, the profit functions, and the equilibrium quality levels for each of the four 
scenarios are presented.  
  Given the assumption that vH 	 vL, all the second derivatives of profits with respect to the 
level of quality are negative. Hence, we can conclude that the solutions in equations (5.9) and 
(5.10) represents local maxima.
15 If neither firm has an incentive to deviate, the solutions are 
stable and represent Nash equilibria, i.e. the conditions represented by equations (4.18) - (4.21) 
are satisfied. Conditions (4.18) and (4.20) are satisfied as we, in solving for z, found that there is 
only one possible solution that satisfies the assumption that vH 	 vL (i.e. z 	 1). Conditions (4.19) 
and (4.21) represent the condition that there is no incentive to “leapfrog” the rival and “switch” 
type of quality for neither of the firms. In Appendix 4 it is shown that these conditions are 
satisfied for all ’s in scenarios (II) and (CC), for   0.3448 in scenario (CI) and for   0.6564 
in scenario (CI).  
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2 = -2vH{(1+)vH - vL}/{vL(vH-vL)
2} < 0 
  17Table 4. Equilibrium Outcomes – Variable Cost of Quality 
 
Scenario (II): The Case with two IOFs   
qH
II  = 2
vH[vH(1+2)-vL] / [4(1+2)
2 vH
2 - (5+8)vH vL+ vL
2] (5.3a) 
qL
II =  
vH(vH(1+4)-vL) / [4(1+2)
2 vH
2 - (5+8)vH vL+ vL
2]   (5.4a) 
pH
II =  2
vH(vH(1+2)-vL)(vH(1+4)-vL)/[.]   = (vH(1+4)-vL)qH   (5.5a) 
pL
II =  
 vL(vH(1+4)-vL)
2 / [.]   = vL(vH(1+4)-vL)qL / vH      (5.6a) 
H
II






2/2 =  [(vH(1+2)-vL)]qH
2-vH
2/2   (5.7a) 
L
II

















     (5.9a) 
vH
II





3  (5.10a) 
 
Scenario (CC): The Case with two COOPs   
qH
CC    = 2
vH[vH(1+)-vL] / [4(1+)
2 vH
2 - (5+4)vH vL+ vL
2] (5.3b) 
qL
CC    = 
vH(vH(1+2)-vL) / [4(1+)
2 vH
2 - (5+4)vH vL+ vL
2] (5.4b) 
pH
CC    = 2
vH(vH(1+)-vL)(vH(1+2)-vL)/[.] =  (vH(1+2)-vL)qH  (5.5b) 
pL
CC    = 
 vL(vH(1+2)-vL)
2 / [.]   = vL(vH(1+2)-vL)qL / vH   (5.6b) 
H
CC





























     (5.9b) 
vH
CC











Scenario (IC): The Case with a High-Quality IOF and a Low-Quality COOP        
qH
IC    =  2
vH[vH(1+)-vL] / [4vH(1+)-vL)(vH(1+2)-vL] (5.3c) 
qL
IC   =  
vH[vH(1+4)-vL] / [4vH(1+)-vL)(vH(1+2)-vL] (5.4c) 
pH
IC    = 2
vH{vH(1+4)-vL}[vH(1+)-vL]/[.] = {vH(1+4)-vL}qH
IOF   (5.5c) 
pL


























   /[(2z(1+)-1)
3(4z(1+)-1)
3]
   (5.9c) 
vH
IC








Scenario (CI): The Case with a High-Quality COOP and a Low-Quality IOF       
qH
CI =  2
vH / [4vH(1+)-vL)]   (5.3d) 
qL
CI    = 
vH / [4vH(1+)-vL)]   (5.4d) 
pH
CI =  2
vH{vH(1+2)-vL} / [.] = {vH(1+2)-vL}qH
COOP   (5.5d) 
pL
CI    = 
 vL{vH(1+4)-vL} / [.] = vL(vH(1+4)-vL) qL
IOF / vH   (5.6d) 
H
CI





2/2   (5.7d) 
L











3   (5.9d) 
vH
CI =  4

2z[2+z(1+)(-3+4z(1+))]/[4z(1+)-1]
3   (5.10d) 
  18Results 
  The four scenarios are summarized and compared in Table 5. Within brackets it is shown 
how the variables are affected in each scenario as the cost of quality increases. Previous 
literature on endogenous choice, not incorporating the issue of ownership structure and generally 
assuming CRS, has established that a high-quality advantage exists with respect to profits, prices 
and quantities (see e.g. Motta, 1993). It is also well known that a cooperative structure, given 
diminishing returns to scale, implies a cost advantage as investor owned firms have to pay the 
farm level marginal cost for all inputs (see e.g. Tirole, 1988). These two factors, the high-cost 
advantage and the advantage of the cooperative structure, are the driving forces in the model. In 
scenario (II) only the high-quality advantage plays a role while both factors play a role in the 
scenario with only cooperatives. The two factors are reinforcing each other in scenario (CI) and 
contradicting in scenario (IC). 
  Due to the comparative advantage of the cooperative structure, we expect the cooperative 
structure to produce a higher level of high quality in the unmixed markets. Correspondingly, the 
CI scenario produces a higher level than the IC scenario as the comparative advantage is larger 
for the cooperative producing the high quality. We also expect that, due to the cost advantage of 
the cooperative structure, vL is larger in scenario (IC) than in scenario (CI) and larger in scenario 
(CC) than in scenario (II). The latter is however true only for high costs of quality.
16  
  In the mixed scenario with a high-quality cooperative, the cooperative possess both the 
high-quality advantage and the structural advantage. As a result the relative advantage of the 
high-quality producer is highest and, hence, the quality spread largest in this scenario. In the 
other mixed scenario, the quality spread is smallest as the high-quality advantage of the investor 
owned firm is counteracted by the structural advantage of the low-quality cooperative. Of the 
unmixed markets, the cooperative structure result in a larger quality spread due to lower costs. 
 
  
                                                 
16 In all scenarios CL/vH < 0   and RL/vH > 0 for small  which implies that the optimal response for the low-
quality firm is to increase vL as  increases. However, as  increases the quality spread decreases and eventually 
RL/vH < 0  in all scenarios but in (IC). As an investor owned firm pay a higher marginal cost for inputs, it is more 
sensitive than a cooperative to any change in . Hence, as the cost of quality increases the low-quality investor 
owned firm will increase the level of quality more than a low-quality cooperative for small , and decrease the level 
more for larger . 
  19Table 5: Summary - Variable Cost of Quality  
a)   
z CI(
) >  CC(
) >    II(
) >    IC(
)  
vL 
b) IC() >  II(
)    CC(





) >  CI(
) >   IC(
) >   II(
)   
qL
d) IC() >  CC(
)      II(
) >    CI(
)  
qH    CI(
) >  CC(
) >    II(
) >    IC(
)  
qT    CC(
) >  IC(
) >   CI(
) >   II(
)   
pL 
e)
   (  0.15)  II(
) >  IC() >   CI() >   CC(
) 
 (   1.5)     CC(
) >    II(
)    
pH 
f)   CI(
) >  CC(
) >    II(
) >    IC(
)   
Farm level, F   II(
) >  IC(
) >    CI() >   CC(=0) 
L 
g) IC() >  CC(
)      II(
) >    CI(
) 
H      CI(
) >  CC(
) >    II(
) >    IC(
)   
Producer Surplus 
h) CI(
) >  II(
)    CC(
) >    IC(
) 
Consumer Surplus  CC(
) >  CI(
) >  IC(
) >  II(
)  
Total Welfare  CC(
) >  CI(
) >   IC(
) >   II(
) 
 
High Quality Market share  CI(=)  >  CC(
) >  II(
) >    IC(
)   
Within brackets the direction of the change within each scenario as  increases is shown. 
a) In scenario IC a Nash 
equilibrium only exists for   0.34 and in scenario IC a Nash equilibrium only exists for   0.65. 
b) The level of 
low quality initially increases as  increases. Except in the IC scenario, vL starts to decrease as  continues to 
increase. First in scenario CI, then in II and finally in CC. As a consequence, II > CC   < 0.5 & CC > II    
0.5. 
c) CC  CI & IC  II. 
d) In scenarios II and CC, qL initially increases before it decreases as  increases. As II 
increase and decline faster than CC, II > CC   < 0.1 & CC > II    0.1. 
e) For  > 0.15 CC>CI & for   0.25 
IC>II. 
f)  In scenario CI, pH initially increase before it decrease at  > 0.1. 
g)  See b), d), e)  
h)  See e). 
 
  The high quality and the cooperative cost advantages promotes larger quantities. This 
explain why scenario (IC) produces the largest quantity of low quality and the smallest quantity 
of high quality while the reverse is true for scenario (CI). A market with only cooperatives will 
produce a larger volume of high-quality goods than a market with only investor owned firms. As 
in a scenario with a homogenous product we find that a market with only cooperatives produce a 
larger total quantity than a mixed market which produce a larger total volume than a market with 
only investor owned firms (see Appendix 5). Of the mixed markets, the scenario including a low-
quality cooperative produces a larger volume as this market is more competitive. Due to the high 
quality and the cooperative cost advantages we find that the high-quality firm produces a larger 
quantity than the low-quality firm in scenarios (II), (CC) and (CI). With a high quality IOF and a 
low quality cooperative, however, the contradicting tendencies result in the high-quality firm 
producing a larger quantity than the low-quality firm only when the cost of quality is small. The 
  20market share for the high-quality good is decreasing in  in all scenarios but scenario (CI). 
Notable is that in scenario (CI) the advantage of the cooperative structure perfectly offsets the 
increase in relative cost caused by an increase in the cost of quality such that the market share for 
high quality is constantly 2/3 as in the case with a fixed cost of quality.  
  The market can be considered to be more competitive the smaller the quality spread, i.e. 
the less differentiated the products are. We conclude that scenario (IC) is more competitive than 
the (CI) scenario, having a smaller quality spread, a smaller price spread and a larger total 
quantity. Furthermore, a market with only investor owned firms is more competitive than a 
market with only cooperatives as the quality spread and the price spread is smaller. 
  In the literature on vertical product differentiation it has been established that the high-
quality firm earns higher profits than the low-quality firm. In section 3 we found that this is true 
for all scenarios for all Nash equilibria (as shown by Lehmann-Grube, 1997). In the case of a 
variable quality cost, we numerically find that this is also generally true in all scenarios but the 
(IC) scenario. In scenario (IC), the comparative advantage of producing high quality is 
eventually offset by the advantage of lower production costs associated with the cooperative 
structure as  increases. 
  Cooperatives and investor owned firms implicitly have the same overall cost of 
production although the producer surplus differ as the processors incentive structure differs. The 
producer surplus is largest in scenario (CI), where the advantage of high quality and the 
structural advantage is reinforcing, and lowest in scenario (IC), where the factors are 
contradicting. A market with only IOFs yields a larger (smaller) producer surplus than a market 
with only cooperatives if the cost of quality is low (high). As cooperatives produce to a lower 
cost and tend promote larger quantities and cover a larger share of the market, the cooperative 
structure implies a larger consumer surplus. The total social welfare is as the consumer surplus, 
highest in scenario (CC) and lowest in scenario (II).  
 
6. Summary and Conclusions 
  We have found that ownership structure matters if the cost of quality is fixed or if there is 
a variable cost exhibiting non-constant returns to scale. The latter is not surprising as this is true 
for homogenous products as well. We examined two farm level cost functions, a fixed cost 
function that is increasing and convex in quality, and a variable cost function that is increasing 
  21and convex in quantity. With a fixed cost function, only cooperatives consider the costs incurred 
at farm level in the quality stage of the game. Hence, an investor owned firm underestimates the 
actual cost of quality and thereby chooses higher levels of qualities and lower prices than a 
cooperative. As a result, the consumer surplus is higher while the producer surplus is lower in a 
market with only investor owned firms than in market with only cooperatives. If the cost of 
quality is low (high), a high quality producing IOF generates larger (smaller) total welfare than a 
high quality producing cooperative. The high quality market share is constant in all scenarios. 
We also found that in all Nash equilibria the high quality firm produces a larger quantity and 
earns a higher profit than the low-quality firm. This confirms the findings in previous studies not 
incorporating the aspect of ownership structure. 
  In the case of a variable cost function at farm level, the cooperative has a cost advantage 
as the investor owned processor has to pay farm level marginal cost for all inputs. Of the high 
quality good, a cooperative produces a larger quantity of a higher level of quality and to a lower 
price. This results in higher profits and a larger market share for the high quality cooperative. In 
the mixed scenarios, a cooperative produce a higher level and a larger quantity of the low quality 
good to a higher price resulting in higher profits. The cooperative structure generates a larger 
consumer surplus and a higher total welfare than the investor owned structure. In addition, we 
found that the high quality firm produce a larger volume and earns a higher profit than the low 
quality firm in scenarios (II), (CC) and (CI). This is in accordance with previous literature  not 
incorporating the aspect of ownership structure. In scenario (IC), this is true only for low costs. 
   From a consumer point of view, investor owned firms are more beneficial than 
cooperatives if the cost of quality at farm level is fixed as the quality levels are higher and the 
prices lower. On the other hand, if the farm level cost is variable, cooperatives generates a larger 
consumer surplus as cooperatives pay a lower price for inputs. From a welfare point of view, the 
cooperative structure is preferable to society if the farm level quality cost is variable. It may be 
argued that society, e.g. for safety reasons, may benefit from having a market structure 
generating a high minimum standard. Then investor owned firms are desirable if the cost is fixed 
and a low-quality cooperative and a high-quality IOF is desirable if the cost is variable. Another 
argument may be that society is better of the higher the level of the high quality as this e.g. may 
imply safer or more nutritional food. Then IOFs are desirable if the cost is fixed and cooperatives 
are desirable if the cost is variable. 
  22Appendix 1. Relevance of Ownership Structure 
 
The equilibrium quantities and prices will depend on ownership structure IFF n > 1, i.e. given a 
“quality” cost function nonlinear in quantities. 

IOF




n/pi) = 0  

COOP





































COOP   
 
The equilibrium quality levels and profits will depend on ownership structure IFF either (1),  
n > 1 &  = 0 (see above), or (2),    0, i.e. there is a fixed cost at farm level. 

IOF
i / vi = [(Piqi)/vi] - g vi
(g-1) - h n  vi
(h-1) K
-( n-1) qi
n - n [ vi
h K
-( n-1)][qi
n/vi] = 0     

COOP
i / vi = [(Piqi)/vi] - g  vi


































Appendix 2. Nash Equilibrium with a Fixed Cost of Quality  
 
Bertrand – fix (II):  (NE 
 ) 
Low to high: 2(vL*, vH*)  2(vH, v1 = vH*) for vH  vH* 

II
LtoH(vH, v1 = vH* k  1)  =  4
2vH
2(vH-vH*) / [4vH - vH*]
2 - vH
2 / 2     let vH = kx, k  1 => 
     =  4
2k
2(vH*)(k-1) / [4k -1]
2 - k
2(vH*)
2 / 2  





We know that the optimal quality levels are independent of  and that vH*=0.2533 
2 . Substitution 
yields: 
II
LtoH(vH, v1 = vH* k  1) = (0.2533) k
2 
2{8(k-1) – (0.2533) [4k - 1]
2} / {2[4k - 1]
2} 
    < (0.2533) k
2 
2(2k-1){4 - (0.2533) [8k]} / {2[4k - 1]
2} 
   <  0  ==>  2(vL*, vH*)  2(vH, v1 = vH*)  ==> Nash equilibrium 
  
 
High to low: 1(vH*, vL*)  1(vL, v2 = vL*) for vL  
 vL*. As the high-quality firm always earns higher 
profit than the low-quality firm, the issue of backwards leapfrogging is not an issue. Hence, 1(vH*, vL*) 
 1(vL, v2 = vL*) for vL  
 vL* follows from the proof that H > L (see Appendix 3) 
 
Bertrand – fix (CC):    (NE 
 ) 
Low to high: 2(vL*, vH*)  2(vH, v1 = vH*) for vH  vH* 

CC
LtoH(vH, v1 = vH* k  1)=  4
2vH
2(vH-vH*) / [4vH - vH*]
2 - (1+)(vH*)
2 / 2      let vH = kx, k  1 =>





2(vL*, vH*) < 2(vH, v1 = vH*) IFF   [8
2(k-1)-{(1+)(vH*)[4k-1]
2}> 0]. We know that vH
II = (1+)vH
CC = 




2]  < 
2(2k-1)[4-
(0.2533)[8k]] < 0     ==>  2(vL*, vH*)  2(vH, v1 = vH*)  ==> Nash eq. 
  
 
High to low:  1(vH*, vL*)  1(vL, v2 = vL*) for vL  
 vL*  follows from the proof that H > L. 
 
 
  23Bertrand – fix (IC):  (NE 
 ) 
Low to high: 2(vL*, vH*)  2(vH, v1 = vH*) for vH  vH* 

IC
LtoH(vH, v1 = vH*k  1)=  4
2vH
2(vH-vH*) / [4vH - vH*]
2 - (1+)(vH*)
2 / 2  
==> 2(vL*, vH*) < 2(vH, v1 = vH*) IFF   [8
2(k-1)-{(1+)x[4k-1]
2}> 0] 
Numerically we find that (1+)vH
IC  vH







2(2k-1)[4-(0.2533)[8k]] < 0 ==>  Nash equilibrium 
  
 
High to low:  1(vH*, vL*)  1(vL, v2 = vL*) for vL  
 vL* follows from the proof that H > L.  
 
Bertrand – fix (CI):    (NE 
   0.59) 
Low to high: 2(vL*, vH*)  2(vH, v1 = vH*) for vH  vH* 

CI
LtoH(vH, v1 = vH*k  1)=  4
2vH
2(vH-x) / [4vH - x]
2 - vH
2 / 2      let vH = kx, k  1 => 
    =  4
2k
2(vH*)(k-1) / [4k - 1]
2 - k
2(vH*)
2 / 2 







2}> (vH*)] fulfilled for   0.54 
Numerical test reveals that 2(vL*, vH*) < 2(vH, v1 = vH*)  if   0.59 ==> Nash equilibrium 
  < 0.59 
 
High to low:  1(vH*, vL*)  1(vL, v2 = vL*) for vL  




Appendix 3. Profits in the Case of a Fixed Cost of Quality  
 
The firm producing the high quality product will earn a higher profit than the firm producing the low 
quality product in all Nash Equilibria in all scenarios. The proofs for the scenarios (CC) and (IC) are 
principally the same as for (II) and are omitted. In the case of the scenario (CI), it is only possible to solve 
numerically. 
 









L = (4pHqL - vH
2) / 2  - (2pLqL - vL
2) / 2  [using (4.7)] 
 =  [2{2pH-pL}qL – (vH
2- vL
2)] / 2 = [2{(vH-vL)}qL – (vH
2- vL
2)] / 2   [using (4.5)] 
   =  (vH-vL)[2qL–(vH+vL)]/2 = (vH-vL)[2
2vH–(vH+vL)(4vH-vL)]/2(4vH-vL)   [using (4.8)] 
   =  vL(z-1)[2
2z – vL(z+1)(4z - 1)] / 2(4z - 1)    
Substitute vL* = 0.0482 
2  & z = 5.2512 => [2
2z – vL(z+1)(4z - 1)]  0     
IOF




Proof for (CI): 
COOP
H > (<) 
IOF





L =  















3   




L)  AS {16z
3+3z-32z
2-2}= 0 







Hence, the high-quality firm will earn a higher profit for all   15.1. As previously noted, a Nash 
equilibrium only exist for  < 0.59 implying that any case were the low-quality firm earns higher profit 
than the high-quality firm is not a stable equilibrium. 
  24Appendix 4. Nash Equilibrium with a Variable Cost of Quality  
 
Bertrand – variable (II):  (NE 
 ) 
Low to high: 2(vL*, vH*)  2(vH, v1 = vH*) for vH  vH* 

II






















Numerically, we find that for each  there is only one root satisfying the assumption that k  1. 
Substituting a specific numerical value of  and the corresponding equilibrium quality, vH*, into the FOC 
(
IC
LtoH/k) we extract the k’s satisfying the assumption k  1. By substituting these k’s into 
II
LtoH we 






 .  
 
Following the same procedure, for both producers in all scenarios, it can be concluded that there exists a 
Nash equilibrium in scenarios (II) and (CC) 
 , in scenario (IC) there exists a Nash equilibrium 
  
 





Appendix 5. Homogenous Products with a Variable Cost of Quality 
 
Summary:   qT   CC   >  IC = CI  >  II 
 p    II   >  IC = CI  >  CC 
 PS  
  
 0.86  II   >  IC = CI  >  CC 
   
  > 2.87    CC  >  IC=CI  >  II   
 
In Bertrand duopoly, both firms will set their price equal to marginal cost, and pi = pj. Hence, pi
IOF = mc
IOF 
= 4vqi and pi
COOP = mc
COOP = 2vqi. The profit function for IOFs and COOPs will be respectively, i
IOF 
= [pi – [c
F
ki/qki] ]qi - v
2/2  = piqi - 2vqi
2
  - v
2/2.     
 
Scenario (II):  p i
IOF = pj
IOF = 4vqi = 4vqj ==> qi = qj 
 q i+qj 
 = qT  (v-p)/v = (v-4vqi)/v = 2qi
IOF
     
==> qi
 = /2(1+2) qT = /(1+2) p = 2v/(1+2) 
i
IOF = piqi - 2vqi
2




























Scenario (CC): p i
COOP = pj
COOP = 2vqi = 2vqj ==> qi = qj 
 q T = 2qi = qT  (v-p)/v = (v-2vqi)/v = 2qi     
==> qi
 = /2(1+) qT = /(1+) p = v/(1+) 
i
COOP = piqi - vqi
2



























COOP = qT = (v-4vqi
IOF)/v = 3qi
IOF
   
==> qi
IOF = /(3+4) qj
COOP= 2/(3+4) qT = 3/(3+4) p = 4v/(3+4) 
i
COOP = piqi - vqi
2




2/2;      i
IOF = piqi - 2vqi
2
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